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No. 84362-7
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
PLAINTIFFS’ ANSWER TO
Defendant/Appellant,
v.
MATHEW & STEPHANIE
MCCLEARY, on their own behalf
and on behalf of KELSEY &
CARTER MCCLEARY, their two
children in Washington’s public
schools; ROBERT & PATTY
VENEMA, on their own behalf and
on behalf of HALIE & ROBBIE
VENEMA, their two children in
Washington’s public schools; and
NETWORK FOR EXCELLENCE IN
WASHINGTON SCHOOLS
(“NEWS”), a state-wide coalition
of community groups, public
school districts, and education
organizations,

MOTION FOR LIMITED
INTERVENTION AND
MOTION TO RECUSE
BY 14 LEGISLATORS

Plaintiffs/Respondents.
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Representative Drew Stokesbary signed and filed two related
motions for 13 of his fellow legislators asking to intervene and have
Justice Yu recused (collectively the 14 legislators’ “Motion”).1 This is
plaintiffs’ Answer pursuant to RAP 17.4(e).
I.

PROCEDURE: THE MOTION’S INTERVENTION
REQUEST LACKS MERIT
The Motion failed to satisfy the three intervention elements it

identified – i.e., that:
(1) the applicants claim an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of what remains of the pending
McCleary action;
(2) the applicants are so situated that the disposition of that action
may as a practical matter impair or impede their ability to
protect that interest, and
(3) the applicants’ interest is not adequately represented by
existing parties.
Motion at 6.2

1

May 8 2018 Motion For Limited Intervention And Motion To Recuse By State
Legislators (“Motion”) and May 8, 2018 Notice Of Erratum By Proposed Intervenors
(“Erratum Notice”). Representative Stokesbary represents the 31st legislative district.
http://drewstokesbary.houserepublicans.wa.gov/about/ . His Erratum Notice identifies the
clients he’s representing as Representatives Matt Manweller, David Taylor, Joe Schmick,
Mary Dye, Mike Volz, Brandon Vick, Jacquelin Maycumber, Cary Condotta, Matt Shea,
Morgan Irwin, Luanne Van Werven, and Senators Michael Baumgartner and Doug
Erickson. Erratum Notice at 1-2.
2
The Motion states the applicable legal test as follows (quoting Superior Court Civil
Rule CR 24(a)(2)): “Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in
an action ... when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and the person is so situated that the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect that
interest, unless the applicants interest is adequately represented by existing parties.”
Motion at 6.
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A.

First Element: Whether Applicant Has A Legally Protected
Interest Relating To The Transaction That’s The Subject Of
The Suit
The subject of this suit: This proceeding is an appeal from the

2010 Final Judgment that found the State’s prior funding formulas
violated Article IX, section 1. This Court’s remedial order required the
State to fund the new formulas the State said it was working on by
September 1, 2018. The parties’ 2018 Post-Budget Filings agree the State
has now met that September 1 deadline.3
Interest in justice: The first interest claimed by the Motion is
applicants’ “compelling interest in the proper resolution of this case.”4
But that doesn’t distinguish them from anyone else interested in the proper
administration of justice. Indeed, if simply being interested in justice is a
legally sufficient “interest” to warrant intervention in a lawsuit, this first
element’s interest requirement is really no requirement at all.
Interest in legislation: The Motion states that the applicants have
a legally sufficient interest because, as legislators, they’ve helped
negotiate and pass State budget legislation.5 Indeed, the Motion says
that’s the only part of the record relevant to the applicants’ intervention
interest:
3

E.g., State’s April 9, 2018 Post-Budget Filing at 9-11; Plaintiffs’ April 30, 2018
Post-Budget Filing at 8-9.
4
Motion at 7.
5
Motion at 7; accord at 2 (these applicants “are among the legislators who have
negotiated and passed state budgets since this case was filed”).
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The record relevant to the motion to intervene consists of the
elected positions as state legislators held by movants and their
roles crafting the legislation now under consideration by the Court.
Motion at 3. If doing one’s job as a legislator is a legally sufficient
“interest” to warrant intervention in lawsuits involving legislation, this
first element’s interest requirement is really no requirement at all for any
legislator. (Nor, under the same “interest” theory, for any other State
official.)
Personal monetary interest: The Motion also suggests that the
applicants have a personal monetary interest because each one of them
is a member of an institution that has been held in contempt and
been fined in this case, and each face the prospect of seeing their
salaries withheld or other personal financial sanctions.
Motion at 7; see also at 8 (“First, and most concretely, the outcome of this
case could affect their salaries”).
But the above factual premise is not true.

For example, the

institution in this case held in contempt and fined is the defendant State –
not the institution these applicants cite their membership in (the
legislature). And since the parties in this case agree the State has now
provided for funding the fine’s $102.5 million principal,6

the only

“prospect” relating to that fine is whether the defendant State (not an
individual legislator) owes accrued interest on the fine’s liquidated daily

6

Plaintiffs’ 2018 Post-Budget Filing at 10-12; State’s 2018 Post-Budget Filing at 14.
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amounts.7

Neither plaintiffs nor the State have argued that individual

legislators are liable for that accrued interest.
In sum: the Motion did not establish the type of legally protected
interest required to satisfy the first element of the intervention it requests.
B.

Second Element: Whether Disposition Of The Suit Impairs
The Applicant’s Ability To Protect His Or Her Legally
Protected Interest
The Motion asserts that “the resolution of this case without

movants’ intervention may impair and impede their ability to protect their
interests, and no current party will adequately represent those interests.”
Motion at 7.
Even if being a citizen interested in justice, being a legislator
interested in legislation, or being an individual asserting a non-existent
7

The plaintiffs and defendant disagree on the issue of whether a $100,000 contempt
sanction fine accrues interest from the date it is immediately due and payable. See, e.g.,
Plaintiffs’ 2018 Post-Budget Filing at 10-12; State’s 2018 Post-Budget Filing at 14;
Prier v. Refrigeration, 74 Wn.2d 25, 32, 442 P.2d 621, 626 (1968) (Pre-judgment interest
is proper “when an amount claimed is ‘liquidated’”; “Little or no difficulty is
encountered by the courts, except when restrained by statute, in allowing interest as
damages for the breach of an obligation to pay a sum of money whose exact amount is
fixed and known. Such an amount is termed a liquidated sum”); In re Marriage of
Kaplan, 2016 Wash.App. LEXIS 1382, 2016 WL 3337280 (Div. 1 June 13, 2016) (“Not
granting an award of prejudgment interest on the CR 11 sanctions would wrongly reward
the at-fault party.... An at-fault party should not benefit by delaying the sanction.”); In re
Structured Settlement Payment Rights of Rapid Settlements, Ltd., 189 Wn.App. 584, 60809, 359 P.3d 823 (2015) (judicial sanctions in civil contempt proceedings have two
purposes: coerce compliance and fund complainant’s loss) [e.g, in this McCleary case,
fund Washington children’s upcoming basic education costs]; Monessen S. R. Co. v.
Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 348, 108 S.Ct. 1837 (1988) (Interest reflects that “‘a given sum of
money in hand is worth more than the like sum of money payable in the future’ [and] a
given sum of money in hand is worth less than the like sum of money had it been paid in
the past.”); Hansen v. Rothaus, 107 Wn.2d 468, 730 P.2d 662 (1986) (prejudgment
interest is based on improper retention of money). Neither plaintiffs nor the State,
however, have argued that individual legislators are liable for any accrued interest
obligation not currently funded by the State.
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personal financial liability constitutes a legally sufficient “interest” to
satisfy the interest element required for intervention, the Motion failed to
demonstrate that applicants’ ability to protect that interest will be impaired
by the Court disposing of what remains of this McCleary suit without their
intervention. The Motion accordingly did not establish the type of legally
sufficient prejudice required to satisfy the second element of the
intervention it demands.
C.

Third Element: Whether Existing Parties Do Not Adequately
Represent The Applicant’s Legally Protected Interest
The applicants’ Motion alleges this element when it asserts that

“no current party will adequately represent [their] interests.” Motion at 7.
The Motion provided no factual basis to allege that neither the
defendant State nor plaintiffs will adequately represent applicants’
interests with respect to the “prospect” of a legislator’s personal financial
liability for accrued interest. Indeed, the Motion cannot provide any good
faith, CR 11 basis for that allegation – for as noted earlier, neither the
State nor the plaintiffs claim that legislators have personal financial
liability for the State’s currently accrued interest obligation (if any).
The Motion provided no factual basis to allege the defendant State
and Attorney General’s Office provide inadequate representation with
respect to applicants’ interest in legislation. To the contrary, the history of
this case confirms the defendant State and Attorney General’s Office are
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zealously representing legislators’ claims that the legislation at issue is
lawful and constitutional.
Finally, the Motion provided no factual basis to allege that the
defendant State and Attorney General’s Office provide inadequate
representation with respect to applicants’ interest in justice and the proper
resolution of what remains of this McCleary case. To the contrary, the
history of this case confirms that the Attorney General’s Office is
zealously defending against plaintiffs’ claims in this case with great skill,
expertise, and ability. (Notably, the Motion did not base its inadequate
representation claim on the Attorney General’s Office rejecting any
request by the applicants that defense counsel move to have Justice Yu
recused – for the Motion did not claim any such request was ever even
made or rejected.)
In short, the Motion did not demonstrate the inadequate legal
representation by the State Attorney General required to satisfy the third
element of the intervention it demands.
D.

Intervention Conclusion
The Motion’s intervention request fails as a straightforward matter

of Washington law because the Motion did not establish the three
elements it cites for the intervention it requests. Supra Parts I.A-C of this
Answer.

PLAINTIFFS’ ANSWER TO 14 LEGISLATORS’ RECUSAL REQUEST - 6
53048807.8

II.

SUBSTANCE: THE MOTION’S RECUSAL REQUEST
LACKS MERIT
Even if Washington law gives legislators a free pass to intervene in

suits they want to intervene in, the pending Motion’s corresponding
recusal request must be denied because it lacks factual and legal merit.
A.

The Motion Rests On An “Alternative Fact” That’s Not A
Fact.
The Motion invokes a different case: Justice Sanders’ recusal after

he met with plaintiffs in a pending appeal and asked them specific
questions about a pivotal issue in that appeal.8
The applicants’ Motion accordingly bases its recusal demand on
the “fact” that, like the plaintiffs in that Justice Sanders case, the WEA is
one of the party plaintiffs in the pending McCleary case.9

8

Motion at 11 (noting that Justice Sanders “embarked on the tour and met with
litigants who had pending cases before the court”); accord, the case invoked by the
applicants’ Motion: In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sanders, 145 P.3d 1208,
(2006) (explaining that Justice Sanders met with plaintiffs in the appeal proceedings
pending before the Court, that he asked “specific questions” about a “pivotal issue” in
that appeal (volitional control), and asked what they thought of the issue); see also State
v. Davis, 175 Wn.2d 287, 307, 290 P.3d 43 (2012) (explaining that In re Disciplinary
Proceeding Against Sanders was recusal from a consolidated case involving several
sexually violent predators (SVPs) after Justice Sanders met with a group of SVPs,
including at least one who was a party to that case and who inquired about a central
issue in the case).
9
Motion at 13 (“Justice Yu both spoke at the annual political event of one of the
plaintiffs here and spent time with individual members of the organization.”); Motion
at 4 (“The record relevant to the motion to recuse is publicly available. The WEA is a
party to this case as one of the plaintiffs, the Network for Excellence in Washington
Schools, includes the WEA as a member.”).
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But that foundational “fact” upon which the Motion relies is not a
fact.10
The party plaintiffs in this case are:
(1) the McCleary family (mom, dad, daughter Kelsey, & son
Carter),
(2) the Venema family (mom, dad, daughter Halie, & son
Robbie), and
(3) the Network for Excellence in Washington Schools (a
Washington non-profit corporation).
February 2010 Final Judgment at ¶¶13-21 (CP 2876-2877).
The politicians filing the pending Motion can dislike – even hate –
the WEA.

That’s entirely their right.

(Heck, some members of the

plaintiff Network for Excellence in Washington Schools probably aren’t
particularly fond of the WEA at times either.)
But political dislike doesn’t change the fact that the WEA is not a
plaintiff in this case. And the Motion offers no legal authority holding that
members of a non-profit corporation are parties to a lawsuit if that
corporation is a party.

10

A casual observer of today’s political climate might excuse the looseness of the
Motion’s factual assertions because, as the Motion itself acknowledges, the applicants
filing that Motion are “inherently political actors” (Motion at 3). And “alternative
facts” are now sometimes invoked by politicians on both sides of the aisle in the other
Washington. But factual looseness should not be excused here, because alternative facts
are not a valid foundation for court filings in this Washington. E.g., CR 11.
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In short: the Motion’s recusal demand must be denied because the
foundational “fact” upon which it bases its demand – that Justice Yu’s
speech was to a party plaintiff in this case – is not a fact.
B.

The Motion Rests On A Faulty Application Of Washington
Law.
Even if one ignores the fact that the WEA is a member of a

plaintiff entity instead of being that plaintiff entity, the Motion must also
be denied because it’s based on a faulty interpretation and application of
the recusal provisions upon which it rests.
The Motion distills its recusal demand down to the Code of
Judicial Conduct being “quite clear” that
a “judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in
which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned[.]”
CJC 2.11. Actual impartiality is not necessary, for when a
“judge’s decisions are tainted by even a mere suspicion of
partiality, the effect on the public’s confidence in our judicial
system can be debilitating.” Sherman v. State, 905 P.2d 355, 378
(Wash. 1995).
Motion at 11-12.11
What the Motion’s legal discussion omits, however, is that
Washington law’s test for determining whether a judge’s impartiality

11

Although the Motion adds that “when it comes to ex parte communications, even
‘inadvertently obtain[ing] information critical to a central issue’ requires recusal”
(Motion at 12, partially quoting Sherman, 905 P.2d at 379), the primary definition of
ex parte communication for the CJC is “‘communication between counsel and the court
when opposing counsel is not present.” E.g., State v. Davis, 175 Wn.2d 287, 306, 290
P.3d 43 (2012) (citing State v. Watson, 155 Wn.2d 574, 579, 122 P.3d 903 (2005) and
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 296 (8th ed. 2004)). The Motion does not claim such
counsel communications happened in this case.
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might reasonably be questioned is an objective test that assumes a
reasonable person knows and understands all the relevant facts.12 And as
summarized in the following paragraphs, the Motion’s recusal request fails
under that test.
Member fact: Here, one relevant fact is that the entity about
which the Motion complains (WEA) is one of 440 community groups,
school districts, and education organizations that are members of the
non-profit corporation Network for Excellence in Washington Schools.13
Other members include, for example, 207 of our State’s 295 school
districts representing more than 90 percent of Washington’s public school
students.14 A reasonable person would not objectively conclude that a
judge’s talking to a group of individuals affiliated with a member school
district (be they parents, or students, or voters) taints that judge with a
reasonable suspicion of partiality such that his or her impartiality might
reasonably be questioned in what remains of this McCleary case. In short:
the Motion did not establish that Washington law provides that if a judge
talks to a group of individuals who affiliate with an entity that is a member

12

E.g., State v. Davis, 175 Wn.2d 287, 306, 290 P.3d 43 (2012) (“The test for
determining whether the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned is an
objective test that assumes that ‘a reasonable person knows and understands all the
relevant facts.’”) (quoting Sherman v. State, 128 Wn.2d 164, 206, 905 P.2d 355 (1995),
which quoted In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1313 (2d Cir. 1988)).
13
This fact is confirmed by the NEWS membership website cited at page 4 of the
applicants’ Motion: https://waschoolexcellence.org/about/news-members/
14
https://waschoolexcellence.org/about/
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of a plaintiff entity, that judge is tainted with a reasonable suspicion of
partiality such that his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
Speech fact:

Another relevant fact is that the Motion

acknowledges there was closed captioning of Justice Yu’s speech.15
But instead of saying applicants bothered to ask for a copy of that
closed captioning transcript, the Motion implies nefarious hiding by citing
an article written by a Mr. Orenstein that claimed “Justice Yu and the
WEA declined to provide a video or audio recording of the speech to the
news media.”16
Simply googling the words “justice yu closed caption transcript”,
however, yields that transcript.17 And a reasonable person reading that
transcript would not objectively conclude that it taints Justice Yu with a
reasonable suspicion of partiality such that her impartiality might
reasonably be questioned in what remains of the pending McCleary case.
Indeed, if anything, that transcript parallels the applicants
themselves when their Motion proclaims that they “make no secret of their
15

Motion at 4-5 (expressly noting that “closed captioning” and including two photos of
that closed captioning).
16
Motion at 5.
17
While drafting this Answer, the undersigned counsel typed the words “justice yu
closed caption transcript” in the Google search term box, pressed the “Enter” key, and
the first hit shown was the following link: https://www.washingtonea.org/membership/
weareblog/post/supreme-court-justice-mary-yu-asks-you-to-invite-judge-to-your-classroom/
Opening that link and tapping on the “closed-captioning transcript of her speech” line
then downloads the closed captioning referenced in the applicants’ Motion. (Anyone
bothering to open that publicly available link would also see the speech was not video or
audio recorded. The above link readily found on Google notes that “While WEA didn’t
record or video her [Justice Yu’s] speech, we were able to retrieve the closed-captioning
transcript of her speech so you can read it for yourself.”).
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support for an amply-funded program of basic education”.18 And their
Motion did not establish that Washington law provides that her speech’s
other point – inviting educators to “think about inviting a judge into your
school to talk about civics, to talk about the rule of law, to come in and
wear a robe and teach your students about this branch of government
whose duty it is to protect the individual rights of everyone” – taints her
with a reasonable suspicion of partiality such that that her impartiality
might reasonably be questioned in what remains of this McCleary case.
Bias fact:

The Motion alleges that applicants are demanding

Justice Yu be recused to ensure an absence of bias on the Court.19 But the
Motion submitted no facts to demonstrate Justice Yu is biased.

It is

neither reasonable nor workable to interpret Washington law to provide
that a judge is tainted with a reasonable suspicion of partiality such that
his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned whenever a
politician alleges that that judge is biased.
Public confidence fact: The Motion contends that applicants are
demanding Justice Yu be recused because they have a genuine and sincere
interest in ensuring public confidence in our judicial system.20

18

Motion at 3.
E.g., Motion at 8 (“Movants have standing to ensure that any decision about such a
resolution is made by an unbiased panel of judges”) & at 3 (claiming the applicants
“have a special interest in ensuring that such judicial review is ... actually unbiased....”)
20
E.g., Motion at 13-14 (“If Justice Yu fails to recuse, ‘the effect on the public’s
confidence in our judicial system can be debilitating’”) & at 3 (claiming the applicants
19
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The Motion submitted nothing to support or establish that
contention. Indeed, to the contrary, applicants here have a history of
instead loudly proclaiming to the public that this Court is not worthy of
public confidence or trust – for example, insisting in social media, their
taxpayer-funded legislative websites, and the press that:


Washington’s Supreme Court Justices have “gone rogue” and
should be impeached.21



Washington’s Supreme Court Justices violate the constitution and
should just pound sand.22

“have a special interest in ensuring that such judicial review...appears to the public as
unbiased”).
21
E.g., applicant Representative Manweller’s first amendment proclamations at
https://twitter.com/mmanweller/status/631896778552426496
(“The Washington Supreme
Court has gone rogue.
It is time for articles of impeachment”); cf. also,
http://blogs.seattletimes.com/politicsnorthwest/2015/01/14/republican-rep-manweller-on-why-hedissed-supreme-court/ (publicly labelling Washington’s Supreme Court as “a group of
judges who have done so much damage to the Constitution they are supposed to
defend”); http://mynorthwest.com/820614/manweller-wait-out-supreme-court/? (on case
pending before Washington’s Supreme Court: “the group of legislators were laughing
because ‘we don’t even need to hear your case, we don’t need to read your pleading, we
don’t need to go to the oral arguments. We already know the outcome of the case before
it is argued.’ That’s what happens when you have an interest group driven court. . . .The
people on the court are there to represent stakeholders, not because they are great legal
minds. ... Their political abilities have gotten them there, not their understanding of
constitutional law.”); https://wsrp.org/state-supreme-court-message-manweller/ (“Once
again, the Court has reminded citizens that they are not intellectually suited to do their
job.... They simply lack the intellectual fire power to grasp complicated policy dilemmas.
But they also fail to understand taxation policy, educational policy, and most
surprisingly, legal procedure.”)
22
E.g., applicant Senator Baumgartner’s first amendment proclamations at
http://michaelbaumgartner.src.wastateleg.org/open-letter-from-members-of-majority-coalitioncaucus-response-to-supreme-court/ (“The court’s order directly contravenes state and
federal constitutional provisions, politicizes the judiciary, and demonstrates disdain for
other co-equal branches of government. ... It is worth noting that no prior court in our
state’s 126 year history has seen fit to issue such an order.”);
http://votebaumgartner.com/#services (list of “Top 10” favorite moments in the State Senate,
with # 7 being “Fighting the State Supreme Court’s unconstitutional overreach on the
McCleary decision. ... When the teacher union election-funded state Supreme Court
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Washington’s Supreme Court Justices should be ignored.23



Washington’s Supreme Court Justices are “very partisan” and
“very biased”.24

The applicants have a First Amendment free speech right to say what they
want to say. But their repeatedly telling the public to not have confidence
in our judicial system undercuts the credibility of their Motion’s
statements to this Court. The Motion did not establish that Washington
law provides that a judge is tainted with a reasonable suspicion of
partiality such that his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned
simply because politicians who consistently call that judge biased file a
Motion calling that judge biased.
In summary: the second reason the Motion’s recusal demand
must be denied is that it rests on a faulty interpretation and application of
the recusal law upon which it rests. As noted at the beginning of this
Answer’s Part II.B, the legal test for whether Justice Yu’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned is an objective test that assumes a
reasonable person knows and understands all the relevant facts. And as
outlined above, those facts do not taint Justice Yu with a reasonable
overstepped their bounds and attempted to dictate to the legislature what should happen
in the budget, I sent them a picture of a bag of sand and a hammer.”).
23
E.g., applicant Representative Taylor’s first amendment proclamation at
https://washingtonstatewire.com/legislators-ignore-supreme-courts-recent-mccleary-ruling/ (“My
personal opinion is we ignore the court”).
24
E.g., applicant Senator Erickson’s first amendment proclamation at
http://www.washingtonagnetwork.com/2016/10/11/ferndale-senator-prepping-legislation-hirstdecision/ (publicly pronouncing our judicial system is headed by “a very partisan, very
biased Washington Supreme Court”).
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suspicion of partiality such that that her impartiality might reasonably be
questioned in what remains of this McCleary case. Politicians are of
course free to like, dislike, or not even care about Justice Yu.

And

depending upon one’s viewpoint, the dislike demonstrated in applicants’
Motion might or might not be warranted. But if the rule of law matters in
our State, politicians’ strong dislike for a judge does not warrant the
recusal these applicants’ pending Motion demands.
C.

The Motion Did Not Demonstrate A Legitimate Entitlement To
The Oral Argument Soapbox These Applicants Request.
The Motion summarily states: “Due to the serious issues raised,

movants also request oral argument on this motion”.25
One can understand the pragmatic political reason for the
14 legislators who filed the Motion to make that request for a news
event.26 But the Motion offers no legal rationale for why the time and
expense of oral argument is needed to rule on the straightforward
intervention and recusal request the Motion makes. The Motion should
accordingly be disposed of on the papers filed.

25

Motion at 3.
With November elections approaching and the understandable need of politicians of
all stripes to rally their respective base, it undeniably makes pragmatic sense for the
legislators filing the Motion at issue to request oral argument to create an event for
audio or video sound bites to repeat or punctuate for the public what they’ve said in the
written court filings. Although that’s an entirely understandable political or public
relations justification, it’s not a legitimate legal justification.
26
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III.

CONCLUSION

The 14 legislators filing the pending Motion have a strong,
not-flattering opinion about Justice Yu. That’s their free speech right. But
as Part I of this Answer explains, their Motion failed to establish a legal
right to the intervention they request.

And even if it did, as Part II

explains, their Motion failed to establish a legal right to the recusal they
demand. Plaintiffs accordingly request that applicants’ Motion be denied.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of May, 2018.
FOSTER PEPPER PLLC
s/ Thomas F. Ahearne
.
Thomas F. Ahearne, WSBA No. 14844
Christopher G. Emch, WSBA No. 26457
Adrian Urquhart Winder, WSBA No. 38071
Kelly A. Mennemeier, WSBA No. 51838
1111 Third Avenue, suite 3000
Seattle, WA 98101-3299
Telephone: (206) 447-8934/447-4400
Telefax: (206) 749-1902/447-9700
E-mail: ahearne@foster.com
Attorneys
for
Plaintiffs/Respondents
McCleary Family, Venema Family, and
Network for Excellence in Washington
Schools (NEWS)
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I am a citizen of the United States of America and a resident of the
State of Washington. I am over the age of twenty-one years. I am not a
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Defendant State of Washington
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Seattle, Washington 98117
summerstinson@gmail.com

Via Electronic Mail
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Proposed Intervenors

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of
Washington that the foregoing is true and correct.
EXECUTED in Seattle, Washington, this 18th day of May, 2018.
s/ Laura G. White
.
Laura G. White, Legal Assistant
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